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Introduction
Christine M. Korsgaard once noted:
Although it is universally acknowledged that human beings are in fact social animals, 
modern moral philosophers have usually not considered it allowable to help themselves 
to this fact in arguments aimed at justifying morality. … But our social nature is deep, 
in the sense that it is the nature of our reasons that they are public and shareable, then 
justifications of morality can and should appeal to it (Korsgaard [1996] 2014, 135).
This diagnosis seems correct, and is even more applicable when it comes to the work of 
contemporary Kantian moral philosophers from John B. Rawls to Korsgaard herself. The 
core of Rawls’s theory of justice consists in taking the ‘original position’ behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance,’ where each individual should represent a free and equal citizen and choose his/
her act without bias or favor. Korsgaard, who accepts Ludwig Wittgenstein’s refutation of 
the idea of private language, argues that we can exchange and share the reasons for our acts, 
despite these reasons themselves coming from the ‘reflective endorsement’ of our individual 
‘practical identities.’
Discourse ethics, which was founded and developed by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-
Otto Apel, tries, on the other hand, to reconstruct Kant’s moral philosophy in terms of a 
theory of intersubjective discourse. According to this theory, our ethical norms must be 
‘discursively redempted’ through critical trials of our ‘validity claims’ of the norms. The 
‘principle of universalization’ then functions as the criterion for assessments. We can safely 
say that this theory appeals to our social relations to justify morality, because the point of this 
theory is that discursive redemption, and discourse itself, is a shared action: no one is able to 
perform it or represent it by him/herself. However, this theory has also been attacked from a 
seemingly Kantian standpoint that rejects the idea of morality based on consensus, and calls 
for a return to the convictions of independent individuals.
In this short paper, I would like to give a critique of moral arguments that still presuppose 
a first-personal starting point, in accordance with the above diagnosis by Korsgaard. 
Needless to say, problematizing subjectivity is a well-known story and covers broad fields in 
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philosophy. However, I am neither going to argue this point in a wider context, which would 
include perspectives such as language-analytical, phenomenological, psychoanalytic or 
mind-body arguments, nor will I provide any detailed reconstruction of Rawls’s, Korsgaard’s 
or even Kant’s moral philosophy. Here, I will just point out that the method of advancing 
moral arguments that presuppose a first-personal starting point does not really seem Kantian. 
Rather, it runs contrary to Kant’s potential theory of the others, which can be derived from 
his doctrine of transcendental idealism. Such a modest conclusion would not be trivial in 
that the aforementioned Kantian moral philosophers would aim to proclaim themselves as 
Kantian henceforth.
For this purpose, I will pick up a seemingly Kantian criticism of discourse ethics made 
by Albrecht Wellmer, who was Habermas’s former assistant in Frankfurt. I am not going to 
do this with regard to the problem of the distinction between morality and law, which is better 
known as Wellmer’s critique of Habermas, but with regard to criticism of the rationality of 
consensus itself. I will investigate the logical consequence of a first-personal reading of Kant 
by means of the contrast between transcendental and empirical idealism, and try to show 
that discourse ethics is in better accordance with Kant’s original thought. The argument will 
proceed as follows: (1) I will investigate Wellmer’s criticism of Habermas from the first-
personal point of view and cast doubt on the precedence of that point of view. (2) I will try to 
reveal that there is a certain assumption about the other behind the act of giving precedence 
to the first-personal point of view. (3) I will contrast that order of precedence with Kantian 
thought on the other and point out that first-personalist theories seem totally contrary to Kant, 
despite their self-attribution as Kantian.
1
As is well known, Habermas introduced the universal principle (U), which every valid 
norm has to fulfill, as the ‘moral principle,’ and the principle of discourse ethics (D), which is 
derived from (U) as follows:
(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests 
(and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for 
regulation).
(D) Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the 
approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse 
(Habermas 1990, 65-66).
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Habermas considers this principle to represent impartiality, which Kant attempted to capture 
via the categorical imperative. Strictly speaking, the compatibility of these principles with 
Habermas’s universal pragmatics, developed in the 1970s, is unclear because the role of the 
counterfactual anticipation of an ‘ideal speech situation’, once placed as a regulative principle 
of each factual communication, is obscured. Yet the central idea of this communicative or 
discursive theory of reason is that morality lies not in our first-personal consciousness but in 
the intersubjective consensus, which we should reach through moral discourse. Habermas 
argues that one cannot make his/her maxim valid alone, in advance of the moral discourse 
in which the maxim should be assessed. At this point, Habermas’s view differs from those 
contemporary Kantians who start their argument from the first-personal perspective. And this 
is the very point that Albrecht Wellmer questions, in his understanding, from the viewpoint of 
Kant.
Roughly sketched, Wellmer argues that we had better understand Kant’s categorical 
imperative as prohibiting non-generalizable maxims (cf. Wellmer 1991, 123-126), and, 
furthermore:
If we understand the categorical imperative in this way, the ‘monologic’ character 
of Kant’s moral principle is not such a serious problem as it appears to Apel and 
Habermas. For if I am unable to will that a way of acting should become a universal 
rule, then we cannot will it either (otherwise I should be able to do so as well). 
We might equally express the point like this: in moral judgement I am above all 
confronted with myself (Ibid. 153).
Although Weller admits that Kant was mistaken in simply assuming that my ‘being able to 
will’ must necessarily coincide with that of all other rational beings, he does not fully accept 
Habermas’s discourse-theoretical reconstruction of Kantian morality. Because, according to 
him, the concept of a consensus achieved on the basis of reasons presupposes the concept 
of a personal conviction. If I have reasons for agreeing, then this means, precisely, that I 
consider a validity claim to be true. But, so he argues, then the truth does not follow from 
the rationality of the consensus, but from the appropriateness of the reasons by which I was 
convinced of its truth. “It is only from the point of view of those involved in the situation that 
consensual rationality appears to be identical with truth” (Ibid. 161). And, in so far as a moral 
discourse is involved here, this objection cannot be dismissed as irrelevant for discussing 
morality but truth1. Wellmer could give precedence to our first-personal conviction about the 
normative validity of our maxims over the consensus of moral discourses. This need not be 
the central part of his criticism of discourse ethics. On the contrary, he suggests the concept 
1 I have criticized Wellmer before with regard to his hermeneutic truth theory (cf. Yoshime 2016, 270-
282).
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of the ethics of dialogue, in which the ‘principle of dialogue’ does not replace Kant’s moral 
principle but works as the main one among many supplementary principles for the moral 
principle. So, he does not actually intend to sustain the claim of the first-personal standpoint. 
Nonetheless, I consider his argument on conviction important for understanding a tendency 
in contemporary “Kantian” standpoints as a whole.
Let us begin with a simple but not trivial question. While arguing that convictions 
precede consensus, he has also admitted that one’s being able to will cannot be regarded 
as identical to that of all other rational beings. And if Habermas is right in saying that the 
categorical imperative has an impartial mind in it then, apparently, a valid maxim is such that 
all other rational beings can also will it, i.e., be convinced of its validity. Then, how is it at 
all justifiable to give precedence to a first-personal conviction over an agreed or ‘exchanged 
and shared’ (in Korsgaard’s sense) conviction of all members of a moral discourse? Wellmer 
emphasizes the fallibility of each consensus achieved in a moral discourse, and that must be 
one of the reasons why he suggests making discourse ethics into a weaker ethics of dialog. 
But it does not amount to a reason for us to regard the first personal conviction as infallible, 
or at least as more reliable.
His answer to this question turns out to be less Kantian. That is, he renounces the 
universal validity of the categorical imperative and understands it as saying, simply, 
something like, “Act according to your normative convictions” or “Do what you (believe 
that you) ought to do” (Ibid. 207). With this ‘minimal’ interpretation of the categorical 
imperative, his previous interpretation of it in terms of prohibition of what one cannot will, 
of course, loses its significance. It was only temporarily employed by Wellmer to make first-
personal convictions also look somehow valid in the context of universal morality. And 
we can and should ask here, again: Why is first-personal conviction given precedence over 
consensus? Even if such a conviction ‘contains no trivial requirement’ as he hopes, and even 
if we admitted that consensus in general is fallible, we could still discuss the matter to find 
new viewpoints, new evidence, or new arguments for or against his conviction. Is there any 
good reason to believe that an individual agent is able to make better judgements about his/
her actions than two or more jointly discussing agents? Wellmer’s thought on our convictions 
strongly suggests the superiority of the first-personal to intersubjective relations with others.
2
The only plausible reason for persistence in the first-personal point of view is that the 
proponents of this view understand consensus as simply agreeing with others, and think 
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that following such agreements is heteronomous (in Kant’s sense)2. As mentioned above, 
Wellmer himself does not maintain such a view. However, it is likely that there are some 
Kantian moral philosophers who do reason in this way. Even for Korsgaard, who accepts 
Wittgenstein’s argument against private language and discusses our social nature, it is 
decisively important that I make the ‘reflective endorsement’ on my reason for acting. She 
states:
The reflective structure of human consciousness requires that you identify yourself 
with some law or principle which will govern your choices. It requires you to be 
a law to yourself. And that is the source of normativity. So, the argument [on our 
‘practical identity’] shows just what Kant said it did: that our autonomy is the source 
of obligation (Korsgaard [1996] 2014, 103-104).
So, having my reason discussed in a moral discourse and following its agreed conclusion 
is heteronomous, as long as the conclusion is not in accordance with my practical identity. 
This could be morally problematic in cases such as that of an egoist who wills to act 
autonomously. On the other hand, Korsgaard has to make her argument consistent with 
the fact that we can exchange and share our reasons. She does this by characterizing the 
difference between one’s relationship to oneself and one’s relationship to others as being one 
of degree (cf. Ibid. 144).
Here I would like to ask the same question: Why does Korsgaard not think of arguing 
that the reflective structure of human discourse requires that individuals identify themselves 
with some law or principle that will govern their exchanging and sharing of reasons, and that 
this is the source of normativity? Or in short, why do others appear so untrustworthy? As G. 
A. Cohen points out in his commentary on Korsgaard, we should place importance on “Kant’s 
insistence that the imperative of morals must not come from human nature, nor even human 
reason, should there be any respect in which human reason differs from reason as such” (Ibid. 
172). Indeed, Kant strictly differentiates pure reason from our “empirically conditioned” 
(CPrR, V, 16) ones. Given that, our autonomy does not come from our human nature, as 
Korsgaard claims, but is, rather, more primordial. And then it must not be the case that each 
of us has his/her own pure human reason but, rather, that we human beings share one pure 
reason.
This is the point that I would like to emphasize in this paper. In my opinion, those first-
personal interpretations of Kant adopt the former understanding and, from the fact that there 
seems be no guarantee of identity between every pure human reason, they are led to hold 
2 For Kant, the principle of autonomy is “the principle of every human will as a will giving universal 
laws in all its maxims” (FMM, IV, 432), and all other principles are principles of heteronomy.
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that following agreements with others amounts to potentially being obligated by a reason 
other than my own. Of course, we know from both everyday life and human history that our 
reasons have a very similar or seemingly identical system but, in principle, we cannot be sure 
of their identity. This unwarrantedness makes no substantial difference in so far as we employ 
a ‘minimal’ interpretation of the categorical imperative, as in Wellmer.
However, I do not think that such a modest moral philosophy is satisfactory as an 
interpretation of Kant. On the contrary, I believe that such an understanding of pure reason 
and others is quite the opposite to that of Kant, considered as a transcendental idealist. I am 
not going to argue that such views are implausible, but in so far as those who hold them call 
themselves Kantian, they should be aware that they are, in fact, deviating from transcendental 
idealism. In what follows, I will try to justify this claim by (re)constructing Kant’s unwritten 
theory of others in terms of transcendental idealism.
3
In the argument so far, I have tried to discover the connection between two ideas. On 
the one hand, the first-personal point of view is precedent over social interactions including 
intersubjective consensus. On the other hand, others may have different (pure) reasons than 
my own. These two ideas sound irrelevant to each other, but as I see it, they run along the 
same lines. In short, according to this view, we should not put our trust in the judgements of 
others, or even those arrived at with others, because they might have their own reasons. Is 
this at all in accordance with Kant’s thought? As frequently pointed out, Kant seldom argues 
about others. Certainly he writes about, for example, our moral obligations to others, the 
realm of ends, the sensus communis, and the cosmopolitan law or right. But he gives, in fact, 
no substantial argument on the other’s reasons or the reason of others.
Here I would like to cite his argument on empirical idealism and transcendental realism 
and apply it to the current issue. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
introduced the contrast between transcendental and empirical idealism, and differentiated 
himself from the latter. Empirical idealists are those who hold that we can never, by way 
of any possible experience, be completely certain as to the existence of external objects 
(cf. CPR, A368-369). According to Kant, this position is the consequence of being a 
transcendental realist:
It is, in fact, this transcendental realist who afterwards plays the part of empirical 
idealist. After wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, 
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must have an existence by themselves, and independently of the senses, he finds that, 
judged from this point of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to 
establish their reality (CPR, A369).
However, Kant himself is a transcendental idealist, who holds that all appearances should be 
understood as being only representations, not things in themselves (cf. ibid.).
I think that we can compare this anti-Kantian standpoint, namely empirical idealism 
based on transcendental realism, with those first-personalist Kantian philosophers, because 
they do not put their trust in others as partners in moral discourse or the ‘exchanging and 
sharing’ of our convictions. Let me try to model this standpoint after Kant’s description. 
Assume that the following paraphrase is possible: that I can never be completely certain 
as to whether others have the same reason as me, amounts to the fact that I can never be 
completely certain as to the existence of other rational beings. This appears to be a kind of 
solipsism, and is obviously stronger than what the aforementioned self-proclaimed Kantians 
presuppose. However, this is no less than what they should maintain, if they maintain the 
universal validity of the categorical imperative. Because, then, my first-personal conviction 
or ‘reflective endorsement’ must be valid universally, despite there being others who can 
discuss the validity of my claim. So, the conclusion would be as follows: There is only one 
rational being among other beings, who can surely make a valid moral judgment, and it is 
me. But of course, such a presupposition would be nonsense because, given that, it would 
become extremely difficult to explain how such an egoistic moral theory could be adopted by 
other people and without collision. Thus, they had to retreat to regarding the validity of my 
conviction as limited, in order to coexist with other egoistic people3.
However, why do these thinkers have to be driven to such a predicament? Because, 
according to our understanding of Kant, they suppose that ‘the other,’ in its most radical 
sense, must have a reason other than my pure reason. Suppose for instance Kant’s concept of 
‘radical evil.’ ‘The other’ in the meaning of this concept must be for our reason completely 
transcendent or incommensurable, so only to be imagined. However, do we really have to 
assume that there should be such a transcendent other outside our space of reasons? If, some 
day, just such an other walks into our space of reasons, then he/she would be, in fact, not 
external for us in the sense of ‘transcendent.’ Apparently, this assumption is excessive for 
Kantian philosophy. Strictly speaking, ‘radical evil’ for Kant is still not enough for such a 
transcendent other because it is already specified in its way of being by Kant, so it is quite 
3 Korsgaard optimistically believes that the problem of such an egoist as a ‘practical solipsist’ will be 
dismissed once we notice that our reasons for acting are private only in an “incidental or ephemeral” 
manner (Korsgaard [1996] 2014, 135), and “inherently sharable” (ibid.). But she could say so only in 
so far as she considered the source of the normativity consists, rather, in this institution of sharing itself 
than our personal identities.
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possible to conceptualize within our space of reasons as the ‘negative quantity,’ which is 
precisely opposite to our reason.
If the presupposition of such an other is not acceptable, then we must hold that every 
logically possible difference among us is, as a whole, within our sole pure reason, and 
so within our space of reasons. In other words, we must adopt transcendental idealism 
concerning the other. Accordingly, this will lead us to Kantian empirical realism regarding the 
other, which Kant himself does not develop enough. It should describe others not by means 
of other reasons but by means of personal difference and private ends within the sole, pure 
reason. Under this condition alone, Kant’s concept of the ‘realm of ends’ has its relevance:
By “realm [of ends]” I understand the systematic union of different rational beings 
through common laws. Because laws determine ends with regard to their universal 
validity, if we abstract from the personal difference of rational beings and thus from 
all content of their private ends, we can think of a whole of all ends in systematic 
connection, a whole of rational beings as ends in themselves as well as of the 
particular ends which each may set for himself (FMM, IV, 433).
And finally, our understanding of pure reason should be reformed in terms of 
intersubjective concepts, as it has allowed those Kantians to regard it as human and, then, 
to be easily led to the familiar first-personal anti-Kantian moral philosophy. We should 
make it clear that our pure reason is not human reason, which could be inferred from the 
first-personal point of view, but an interpersonal and intersubjective one. For example, 
Korsgaard’s ‘exchanging and sharing’ may work in this way. However, there is a more 
systematically elaborate concept available for us, called ‘discourse’, which embodies 
communicative or discursive reason.
Abbreviations for Kant’s Writings
CPR = Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, intr. by Howard Caygill, 
bibliography compiled by Gary Banham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
CPrR = Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor, intr. by Andrews Reath, 
11th pr., Cambridge University Press, [1997] 2010.
FMM = Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, in: Critique of Practical Reason And 
Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, trans. and ed. with an intr. by Lewis White Beck, 
The university of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. 50-117.
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